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The State does not object to a reasonably expedited schedule that 
allows sufficient time to gather, process, and present to the Court the 
information and argument necessary for it to issue a fair and considered 
order. However, the briefing schedule proposed by the Plaintiffs is not 
calculated to bring the best information and briefing before the Court. 
Preparing a full and complete report and briefing that provide real data, 
explanation, and assistance to the Court is not possible under the truncated 
deadlines they propose. Their proposed schedule is a recipe for providing 
the Court with insufficient information and argument for its decision-
making. The State provides an alternative schedule herein that allows time 
to accomplish the task, while still expediting review. 
The Court should decline the Plaintiffs’ request that it identify and 
threaten sanctions now, before the 2016 Legislature has even convened. 
Doing so likely would delay progress toward constitutional compliance 
rather than encourage it. Moreover, the sanctions advocated by the 
Plaintiffs are unworkable and constitutionally unsound. The proper time to 
determine whether further sanctions are needed is at the conclusion of the 




A. Neither the Court Nor the Legislature Would Be Well Served 
by Truncating the Briefing Schedule 
1. Plaintiffs’ arguments for a truncated briefing schedule 
rest on a series of unfounded premises 
First, the Plaintiffs argue that the 2016 legislative session is the 
final opportunity for the State to achieve constitutional compliance by 
2018. In fact, two more legislative sessions will occur before the 
beginning of the 2017-18 school year. And by constitutional design, the 
2017 session will be a long, biennial budget-writing session. 
 Second, the Plaintiffs assume the 2016 Legislature will accomplish 
nothing. But the outcome of the legislative session cannot be assumed. 
The only certainty is that there is a constitutionally mandated process by 
which the Legislature enacts policy and budget legislation. The House and 
Senate are constitutionally established as deliberative bodies who can take 
action only by achieving a sufficient number of votes, with each vote 
independently cast by independently elected representatives of the people. 
Members are as diverse as the populace they represent and they must be 
responsive to all state obligations of all levels of importance. That 
constitutional process cannot be short-circuited or bypassed. 
Moreover, there are many measures of progress toward ultimate 
constitutional compliance. The $4.8 billion dollars of new biennial 
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spending committed to basic education compared with 2012 is but one 
measure of progress. The issues to be addressed between now and 2018 
are complicated, requiring difficult decisions about revenue and spending 
that affect all of the State’s obligations—not just basic education. Even as 
to the funding of basic education, challenging problems remain to be 
resolved—such as how to accommodate local discretion in implementing 
the state’s program and deploying state funding allocations while still 
ensuring accountability among the State’s 295 school districts. The steps 
taken toward resolving these kinds of issues also represent progress. 
Third, the Plaintiffs erroneously posit that haste is more important 
than providing the Court with a fair and accurate presentation of the facts 
and issues. Like the Court, the Legislature has schedules and deadlines it 
follows. Important legislation—including any adjustments to a $38 billion 
biennial operating budget—typically is not finalized until the closing days 
and hours of the legislative session, and it does not take effect without 
being presented to the Governor. Wash. Const. art. III, § 12. Consistent 
with the Court’s July 2012 Order,
1
 the Legislature communicates with the 
Court through its Article IX Committee. At the conclusion of the session, 
that Committee must meet, reach consensus, and direct staff in preparing 
the report to the Court. Typically, the Committee has scheduled one or 
                                                 
1
 Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (July 12, 2012). 
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more public meetings as part of its process. It is not reasonable to expect 
the Article IX Committee, legislative staff, and the State’s attorneys to 
meet, discuss, gather information, write, format, and file an accurate, 
useful, and complete report and briefing mere hours after the session 
finishes. 
The Plaintiffs do not explain how denying reasonable time to 
accomplish these tasks will make a positive difference in the Court’s 
ability to evaluate the State’s progress. Their sole conclusory rationale is 
that everyone will know what has been enacted the minute the session 
adjourns and therefore the State needs no time to prepare a report and 
brief. Pltf ’s Mot. at 8-9. By their logic, since legislating is a public 
process, the Plaintiffs will also know what has been done and therefore 
they need no time to prepare their critique of the State’s progress. Under 
that logic, the Court also will know what has been enacted and therefore 
could skip the briefing altogether and simply issue an order the day after 
adjournment. 
Of course, this is all absurd. The stakes are too high. For the Court 
to issue a well-considered order, it needs a full and complete report and 
briefing that addresses the actual circumstances, issues, and actions taken. 
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2. The Court should establish a 2016 briefing schedule 
that provides both parties sufficient time to prepare 
submissions that thoughtfully and adequately address 
the current circumstances 
Plaintiffs give no weight to the gravity of the orders they seek from 
the Court. In issuing orders that are directed at compelling legislative 
action—a power reserved by the Constitution to the legislative branch—
the Court is operating at the margin of its constitutional power, and there 
is no other avenue of appeal should the Court misstep. The constitutional 
stakes are too high—for the State, the Court, the Legislature, and the 
people we all serve—to rush to determine the appropriate next step. That 
determination should not be made until the circumstances and facts are 
established and the options fully briefed. 
In 2012, the Court established a briefing schedule to govern 
reporting while the Court retained jurisdiction. It provides that the State’s 
submissions are due at the conclusion of each legislative session from 
2013 through 2018 inclusive, within 60 days after the final biennial or 
supplemental operating budget is signed by the Governor, and at such 
other times as the Court may order. The Plaintiffs seek to reduce that 
60-day period to a matter of hours. Although the Plaintiffs’ proposed 
schedule is unsupportable, the State is amenable to reasonably 
abbreviating the default schedule established in the Court’s July 2012 
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Order. The State therefore can agree to shorten the default schedule by 
half and offers the following alternative schedule for the Legislature’s 
report and the parties’ briefing addressing that report: 
 The Legislature’s Report and State’s Brief to be filed 30 days 
after the Governor signs the supplemental budget. 
 Plaintiffs’ Response to be filed 20 days after State’s Brief. 
 State’s Reply to be filed 10 days after Response. 
The Court then may schedule oral argument as it deems appropriate. 
There is no good reason to require both a “post-adjournment 
filing” and a “post budget filing.” Legislation does not become law until 
the Governor signs it, subject to any vetoes, or the constitutionally-
specified time passes without the Governor’s signature (five days during 
session, 20 days after adjournment). Wash. Const. art. III, § 12. Action by 
the Governor provides certainty as to the outcome of the session, and it 
necessarily must occur shortly after adjournment. Reporting and briefing 
to the Court therefore can be accomplished in one filing. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Sanctions Disregard Constitutional and 
Institutional Limits on the Court’s Remedial Powers and 
Would Be Counterproductive and Harmful 
 The Plaintiffs ask the Court to decide now on the sanction it will 
impose for the 2016 Legislature’s failure to produce a plan—before the 
Legislature has even convened and before the Court is informed as to the 
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facts and circumstances attending the Legislature’s actions. The Court 
should not do so, for at least five reasons. 
1. Plaintiffs disregard the basis for the Court’s contempt 
finding 
 The Plaintiffs continue to treat the failure to produce a plan as if it 
is a constitutional failure. It is not. With regard to contempt sanctions, the 
issue is not whether the Legislature has failed to meet its constitutional 
duty under article IX, section 1—the Court already has decided that issue. 
The issue is not whether the State has achieved compliance by 2018—that 
deadline has not yet passed. The immediate issue, and the only basis for 
having found the State in contempt, is the failure to submit a “complete 
plan.” The 2016 Legislature can remove that basis for contempt. 
2. Plaintiffs disregard constitutional limits on the Court’s 
contempt powers 
 In their attempt to expand contempt sanctions beyond their factual 
predicate—the failure to produce a plan—the Plaintiffs disregard 
constitutional limits on the Court’s powers. There is no precedent in this 
state that authorizes the Court to expand its contempt power beyond the 
constitutional limits on judicial authority. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs 
continue to ask the Court to use its contempt power to compel specific 
legislative actions that are constitutionally delegated to the Legislature. 
See Brown v. Owens, 165 Wn.2d 706, 718-19, 206 P.3d 310 (2009) (the 
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doctrine of separation of powers stands as a constitutional bar against one 
branch of government invading or undermining powers that are 
constitutionally delegated to another branch). 
 The Plaintiffs’ second proposed sanction (suspending all “tax 
exemption statutes” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 13)) is especially problematic in this 
regard. In briefing filed in July 2014, the State explained the potential 
separation of powers problems with several sanctions suggested by 
Plaintiffs, including the ad hoc invalidation of taxing statutes that have not 
been challenged. Reaching that far afield to determine the taxing policies 
of Washington unquestionably invades the Legislature’s constitutionally 
designated function. 
 Article VII, section 5 of the Washington Constitution vests the 
State’s authority to impose taxes solely in the Legislature. See Larson v. 
Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wn.2d 752, 770, 131 P.3d 892 
(2006) (“It is elementary that the power of taxation, subject to 
constitutional limitations, rests solely in the legislature.”) (quoting State ex 
rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 690, 30 P.2d 638 (1934)); 
Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King County, 69 Wn.2d 49, 51, 416 P.2d 694 (1966) 
(“[Article VII] places revenue and taxation matters under legislative 
control. We may construe but not legislate in tax matters.”); Gruen v. State 
Tax Comm’n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 64, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) (“[T]he state’s fiscal 
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policy has been by the constitution delegated to the legislature and not to 
this court.”), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Wash. State 
Finance Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). If the 
Legislature falters, the constitutional remedy is to invalidate the effort and 
direct the Legislature to try again; it is not for the Court to step into the 
Legislature’s shoes. 
3. Plaintiffs’ proposed sanction would harm school-
children 
 The other sanction the Plaintiffs propose would effectively shut 
down schools. In briefing filed in July 2014, the State explained how this 
proposed sanction directly harms schoolchildren, especially those without 
the economic means to obtain alternative educational opportunities. It is 
based on the false premise that no education is preferable to the education 
Washington students currently receive. 
4. Plaintiffs seek to invalidate statutes that are not 
identified, briefed, or shown to be unconstitutional 
 The scope of the sanctions proposed by the Plaintiffs is undefined 
and unknown. No one has identified to the Court which “tax exemption 
statutes” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 13) the Plaintiffs would have suspended. And the 
Plaintiffs do not identify which “K-12 school statutes” they believe “are 
not amply funded” (Pltf ’s Mot. at 12)—would they have all 72 chapters of 
Title 28A invalidated or just those they pick and choose? 
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 Even if the specific statutes the Plaintiffs would have suspended or 
invalidated could be identified, they are not properly before the Court. The 
State is not aware of any decision of this Court that suspended or 
invalidated statutes that had not been specifically challenged and briefed 
by the parties. 
 Nor is the State aware of any decision of this Court that suspended 
or invalidated a statute for any reason other than its unconstitutionality—
indeed, unconstitutionality is the only basis for the Court to invalidate a 
statute. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. 
Ass’n, 83 Wn.2d 523, 527–28, 520 P.2d 162 (1974) (a court has no 
substantive power to review and nullify acts of the Legislature apart from 
passing on their constitutionality).
2
 Since statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, the Plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of demonstrating their 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
3
 School Dists.’ Alliance for 
                                                 
2
 See also City of Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968): 
Is it proper for the courts to try to compel the adoption of legislation 
and the expenditure of public funds for the attainment of seemingly 
desirable ends by refusing to uphold existing legislation? Is this a 
legitimate use of the judicial power? We think not. . . . Obviously, the 
courts ought not invalidate legislation simply in the hope of compelling 
better legislation. 
Id. at 800-01 (Hale, J., with two judges concurring and two concurring in result). 
3
 To be precise, the State has found no case in which the Court has “suspended” 
a statute. Accordingly, it appears that the “suspension” the Plaintiffs seek is in reality a 
kind of “temporary invalidation” which, if it exists as a permissible remedy, is subject to 




Adequate Funding of Spec. Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605-06, 244 
P.3d 1 (2010); Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220, 5 P.3d 691 
(2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001). That burden cannot be met 
where specific statutes have not been identified or briefed. 
5. Plaintiffs’ proposed sanctions may not lead to more 
rapid constitutional compliance 
 The Plaintiffs wrongly assume that identifying heightened 
sanctions on the State now will lead to more rapid action by the 
Legislature and more certain compliance with article IX, section 1. In fact, 
the opposite may be true. Progress may slow because of legislative 
resistance to Court orders that are perceived—rightly or wrongly—to have 
invaded the Legislature’s constitutional sphere. 
 The Legislature is not just another litigant before the Court. It is a 
co-equal branch of government with separate and specific constitutional 
obligations that may lie beyond the judicial power to compel. Imposing 
the proposed sanctions could have an unintended effect: shifting 




                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Some Lawmakers Challenge Court Over Mccleary Sanctions, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/some-lawmakers-challenge-court-over-sanctions/; Mike Faulk, Local Senators Call 






 Relatedly, the State believes the Court has misapprehended the 
substantial progress the Legislature has made since 2012. Plaintiffs’ 
ongoing disdain for the progress made to date has only contributed to that 
situation. The Legislature is on track to fully fund all the commitments it 
made in SHB 2776 (Laws of 2010, ch. 236) by the deadlines it enacted in 
2010. It is continuing to work to resolve the remaining issues necessary to 
achieve constitutional compliance. Plaintiffs wrongly assume only 
legislative inaction and failure. The Court should not do the same. The 
Court needs to assess the situation at the end of the 2016 session and 
determine at that time what action is appropriate going forward. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 The Court should adopt the reasonable schedule proposed by the 
State for briefing following the 2016 legislative session: 
 The Legislature’s Report and State’s Brief to be filed 30 days 
after the Governor signs the supplemental budget. 
 Plaintiffs’ Response to be filed 20 days after State’s Brief. 
 State’s Reply to be filed 10 days after Response. 
 The Court should not identify or threaten any sanction at this time. 
It should wait until it is fully informed as to the facts and circumstances of 
actions taken by the 2016 Legislature, and it can be fully informed only if 
 
  
it allows adequate time for preparation of the Legislature's Report and the 
parties' briefs. 
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